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Colin Minor 
 
Filipino Guerilla Resistance to Japanese Invasion 
in World War II 
 
At approximately 8:00 pm on March 11, 1942, General Douglas 
MacArthur, commander of the United States Army Forces in the 
Far East, along with his family, advisors, and senior officers, left 
the Philippine island of Corregidor on four Unites States Navy PT 
(Patrol Torpedo) boats bound for Australia. While MacArthur 
would have preferred to have remained with his troops in the 
Philippines, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Army Chief 
of Staff George Marshall foresaw the inevitable fall of Bataan and 
the Filipino capital of Manila and ordered him to evacuate. 
MacArthur explained upon his arrival in Terowie, Australia in his 
now famous speech, 
 
The President of the United States ordered me to 
break through the Japanese lines and proceed from 
Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I 
understand it, of organizing the American 
offensive against Japan, a primary objective of 
which is the relief of the Philippines. I came 
through and I shall return.1 
 
While the soldiers who served under him may have understood 
the reasons behind it, MacArthur’s departure nonetheless left the 
officers and infantry behind on the Philippines feeling betrayed 
and dispirited, and understandably so. After all, MacArthur and 
his staff were now in the relative safety of Australia, preparing for 
a campaign for combatting Japanese forces in Papua New Guinea 
to relieve pressure from the Allied Forces’ Australian bases; at the 
same time, the American and Filipino soldiers remaining in 
Bataan and on Corregidor were preparing for a doomed defense 
of the bases MacArthur had just abandoned. While MacArthur 
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received the Congressional Medal of Honor and was named 
Supreme Allied Commander of South East Asia, Bataan and 
Corregidor fell on April 9 and May 6, respectively, bringing an 
end to direct, organized United States Army resistance to the 
Japanese invasion of the Philippines until MacArthur’s return in 
October of 1944.2 
  However, resistance to Imperial Japan in the Philippines 
did not cease while MacArthur was away. During this 
interregnum there were concerted, determined local resistance 
groups opposed to the Japanese occupying force. These forces 
achieved an unexpected level of success given the disparity in 
resources between themselves and the Imperial forces, resulting 
both in victories for themselves and decreased work necessary for 
MacArthur’s forces upon their return. It is important to note that 
there were American forces still in the Philippines at the time, 
having either evaded or escaped from the Japanese occupying 
forces; however, this paper looks primarily at the contributions of 
native Filipino in the resistance movements from 1942 through 
1944. In the following pages I will attempt to outline and explain 
key reasons for the success of these local groups. Specifically, the 
methods and techniques, resistance organizations, and resistance 
leaders were key elements in the Filipino resistance to Imperial 
Japanese occupation. Accompanying these are preceding and 
succeeding sections providing historical context for the Filipino 
resistance. 
 
Filipino Resistance to Colonial Powers 
 
The islands of the Philippine Archipelago have varied cultures, 
languages, and histories. These distinct peoples were involved 
with Southeast Asian trade and the cultures and religions 
prominent in the area, particularly Islam. The history of Western 
contact with the Philippines began when Ferdinand Magellan 
claimed the islands for Spain on his voyage of circumnavigation 
in 1521. Colonization did not begin until 1565, and Spanish 
colonists quickly established control of the archipelago. Over the 
next three centuries, Spanish overlords faced sporadic resistance 
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from the Muslim population chafing under Catholic rule and 
Filipino groups seeking independence. 
 The Philippine Revolution beginning in 1896 and the 
Spanish-American War of 1898 offered opportunities for Filipino 
independence, but imperialist ideas and American racial beliefs 
saw the Philippines remain subjugated at war’s end, now as an 
American territory.3 Horrendous treatment of the native 
population rekindled Filipino resistance and sparked a third 
conflict, the Philippine-American War, which lasted until 1902.4 
Small remnants of the unrecognized First Philippine Republic 
continued to combat the newly installed Philippine Constabulary 
for close to a decade.5 American colonial incursion onto the lands 
of the Moro Muslims on Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan continued 
local resistance there as well but slowed significantly after a 
mandatory disarmament in 1911, and guerrilla forces would not 
be prominent in the archipelago again until the Japanese invaded 
the islands over thirty years later. 
 
Guerilla Methods and Techniques 
 
One of the most important reasons for the success of the Filipino 
resistance movements during the Second World War was the 
methods and techniques that they utilized, chief among them 
guerrilla-style warfare. Merriam Webster defines a “guerrilla” as, 
“a person who engages in irregular warfare especially as a 
member of an independent unit carrying out harassment and 
sabotage.”6 As Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu said,  
 
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the 
enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to 
attack him; if two to one, to divide our army into 
two. If equally matched we can offer battle; if 
slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the 
enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee 
from him. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be 
made by a small force, in the end it must be 
captured by the larger force.7 
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Certainly, in an otherwise even scenario, as Sun Tzu intends, a far 
larger force will almost always overwhelm its opponent, if only 
due to reinforcements and fatigue of the superior and inferior 
forces, respectively. However, this maxim will not necessarily 
hold if certain other factors are present: superior knowledge of the 
local terrain provides information on strategic points and informs 
strategy; a distracted enemy is unable to muster its full force. 
Furthermore, anti-guerrilla tactics, if too harsh, can instead serve 
to bolster resisting forces. The Filipino guerrilla groups that 
fought against the Japanese occupational forces and, later, the pro-
Japan Philippine Constabulary were able to use these factors to 
their advantage. I will use these examples to examine the tactics of 
the Hukbalahap and the Moro Muslim guerillas, beginning with 
geographical knowledge. 
 The Philippine Archipelago is a series of over seven 
thousand islands located between the South China Sea and the 
Philippine Sea. The islands are categorized geographically into 
three major groups: Luzon in the north, Mindanao to the south, 
and Visayas in the center.8 The islands’ beautiful mountainous 
terrain gives way downhill to the low coastal regions that contain 
the majority of the Philippines’ major settlements. However, it is 
the rainforests on the slopes between the peaks and coast that is of 
most concern here. These forests served dual purposes to the 
guerrillas: obscuring unit movement and hiding and defending 
fortifications.9 In particular, the Hukbalahap utilized the cover the 
forest provided to allow for easy retreats from strikes and 
engagements and to hide their base located at Mount Arayat, from 
which they organized their operations throughout Luzon.10 While 
they were highly active and, being the most visible form of 
resistance, often targeted by the Japanese, what casualties they did 
suffer were minimal, and the Hukbalahap achieved considerable 
success in their actions through the use of the environment as 
cover in guerrilla actions.11  
 In the case of both the Hukbalahap of Luzon and the Moro 
Muslims on the islands of Sulu, Lanao, and Cotabato (to name just 
a few), the inclusion of a distracting civilian presence was a boon 
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to the guerrillas as well.12 With Japanese forces and the 
Constabulary they instituted keeping tabs on the Filipino people, 
there would be times and locations where they would not and 
could not keep tabs on rebel forces. Nor did a distinct lack of 
cooperation from the local populace make Japanese efforts to keep 
control any easier. Refusing to believe the Japanese propaganda of 
“Asia for the Asiatics” and similar slogans, belligerent Moro 
officials and civilians provided all the more chances for guerrillas 
to take advantage of opportunities afforded to them to harry and 
sabotage Japanese forces.13 The galling treatment of those same 
people by the occupying Japanese led to increased support of the 
guerrillas by the local population.14 On both Luzon and the 
Muslim islands the violent methods used by Japanese forces to 
extract information about, find, and deal with the rebellious 
Filipinos may have yielded the results they wished for in the short 
term, but it ultimately led to the “fence sitters ... toppling in the 
right direction,” as Army Colonel Russell Volckmann, the 
American guerrilla commander in Northern Luzon, put it.15 
 Another technique (or, more accurately, series of 
techniques) utilized by Filipino guerrillas in resisting the Japanese 
occupying force was the traditional Filipino martial art known as 
eskrima (also called Arnis and Kali, among other names). The first 
Western exposure to what may have been the martial practice of 
eskrima came on the occasion of Magellan’s death in battle with 
the Cebuano chief Lapu Lapu. The only written record of the 
event, belonging to a passenger on Magellan’s ship, states that the 
explorer was overwhelmed and killed by a large group who “all 
hurled themselves upon him.”16 Eskrimador oral tradition, 
however, holds Lapu Lapu as a hero who bested Magellan in 
single combat. The truth likely lies somewhere between the two 
tales; regardless, eskrima through World War II was a secretive, 
traditional Filipino art that emphasized the flexibility and 
comprehensiveness of the style. 
 Primarily utilizing weapons such as swords, knives, and 
rods, eskrima also includes joint-locks and grapples that can be 
practiced bare-handed. This is accomplished by using the same 
movements regardless of the weapon(s) at hand, with the rod or 
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blade seen as an extension of the limb, rather than a tool. In 
addition, movements are based on angle and location of attack, 
rather than on specific defenses for each technique. In this way 
eskrima is similar to Japanese kenjutsu (literally “sword arts”), 
although all forms and weapons of eskrima are taught as a single 
art, unlike kenjutsu and aikido, which use many of the same 
motions despite being separate martial arts. 
 Various notable eskrimadors and grandmasters 
participated in the guerrilla movements in World War II, several 
of them from the famed “Doce Pares” school tree, including the 
Cañete brothers and Teodoro Saavedra. While Cacoy Cañete (and 
his brother) would survive the war and use the combat experience 
he gained to modify the Doce Pares style, Japanese forces 
captured and killed Saavedra, regarded as one of the best in his 
generation. Despite this, his story, as passed down by the Doce 
Pares and Balintawak schools and told by grandmaster Crispulo 
Atillo, provides a useful, if most likely exaggerated, case of 
eskrima in the Second World War.17 A visit to town by Saavedra 
coincided with an attack on a Japanese convoy. In response, 
occupational forces arrested various Filipinos in the area. 
Saavedra utilized his skills in eskrima to combat seven Japanese 
troops, but he was ultimately unable to escape. As he was being 
tortured, Saavedra freed himself and fought four sword-wielding 
Japanese soldiers with his bare hands. Atillo says his attacks were 
“so fierce, they had to shoot him to death in order to prevent the 
death of their poorly trained soldiers.”18 While at least some of the 
story is likely hyperbole, or even outright false, the tale of 
Teodoro Saavedra provides insight on how a skilled eskrimador 
and the art in general contributed to the Filipino resistance 
movement. 
 
Guerilla Groups and Organizations 
 
Another key reason for the success of the Filipino guerrillas was 
the groups and organizations of the resistance. It is important to 
note that while the Filipino guerillas were not structured as 
traditional military forces are, they still had distinct organizations 
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whose structure contributed to their overall success. While these 
groups had very different backgrounds, modus operandi, and 
dispositions, all held the same shared goal: the expulsion of 
Japanese forces from the Philippine Archipelago. I will discuss the 
actions of three particular groups active in the fight against the 
Japanese: those under the United States Army Forces in the Far 
East (USAFFE), the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga Hapon (or 
Hukbalahap, for short); and the Moro Muslims.  
While there were American forces serving under 
MacArthur that either evaded capture or escaped captivity, there 
were also a fair number of Filipinos who did the same. These 
guerrillas, and those who later joined them, fell under the 
purview of the United States Army Forces in the Far East and 
reported, through intermediaries and COs, to General MacArthur. 
Under the command of officers such as Colonels Wendell Fertig, 
Russell Volckmann, and Hugh Straughn, and Captain Robert 
Lapham, the groups that collectively formed the guerrilla forces of 
the United States Army Forces in the Far East served as the eyes, 
ears, and hands of the United States Army between MacArthur’s 
departure and his return. 
One of the marquee Filipino outfits under the USAFFE 
banner were the Hunters ROTC. Formed by and initially 
comprised of cadets from the Philippine Military Academy, the 
Hunters ROTC (also known as “Terry’s Hunters” after Eleuterio 
“Terry Magtanggol” Adevoso who took control following the 
capture of the unit’s commanding officer Hugh Straughn, and 
executive officer and founder Miguel Ver) were regarded as one 
of the most successful guerrilla units on Luzon.19 Of particular 
note were their intelligence contributions and their role in the raid 
on the Los Baños internment camp to free American and Filipino 
prisoners. The Hunters, along with other Filipino guerrilla groups, 
provided information on the region, slowed the arrival of 
Japanese reinforcements, and eliminated guards of the camp.20  
Another notable guerrilla raid had occurred less than a 
month earlier. Guerilla Captain Juan Pejota, serving under Robert 
Lapham, executed the raid on Cabanatuan to free prisoners of war 
from the Bataan Death March of 1942 in conjunction with the 
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forces of Colonel Henry Mucci.21 The information provided and 
the planning done by Pejota led directly to the success of the 
operation; adding to this the defense of the POW’s retreat more 
than earned Pejota and his men Bronze Star Medals for their 
service, making them one of the most decorated Filipino units in 
the war.22  
Another key organization in the fight against the Japanese 
was the Hukbalahap. An abbreviated form of the Filipino 
translation for “the nation’s army against the Japanese,” the 
Hukbalahap was originally created by the leaders of groups of poor 
farmers, and it numbered just 500. Under the leadership of Luis 
Taruc, the organization grew to over 15,000 by 1943, drawing 
primarily from agricultural regions of Luzon.23 The “Huks” were 
not just a group of farmers, however. As the military branch of a 
growing Marxist movement in the Philippines, Taruc and the 
Hukbalahap had political ambitions as well, frequently putting 
them at odds with American forces, particularly when it came to 
recruitment and materiel. Despite low initial numbers, Taruc’s 
forces found success, often by any means necessary. Unable to 
work out an agreement with American forces regarding supplies, 
the Huks raided USAFFE arms caches. Talented recruits were 
given the option to join or suffer. Japanese raids resulted in the 
loss of soldiers and officers, but despite the Huk’s disorganization, 
their survival only strengthened their resolve.24 
Key to Huk success was the organizational system, with a 
base unit of hundred-man squadrons. At the outset, the 
Hukbalahap consisted of only five such groups; by March of 1943 
the organization was 10,000 strong, split into at least forty 
detachments.25 The focal point of system was Taruc himself, who 
oversaw and directed the movements of the organization, 
particularly the information network, and strengthened the 
territory already acquired as the war progressed. By the end of the 
war, the Hukbalahap had established a legitimate presence within 
the Philippines, even if the USAFFE and the Philippine Republic 
did not wish to recognize them as such. 
A third group resisting the Japanese occupation was the 
Moro Muslims native to the southwestern islands of the 
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Philippine Archipelago such as Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. 
The Moros have come into conflict with every imperial power that 
claimed their land since the fall of the Sulu Sultanate, and the 
Japanese occupational force was no different. The strength they 
showed in their struggle with Imperial Japan was noted, with 
reports of them forcing Japanese troops to retreat to their ships at 
night for fear of attack.26 Furthermore, Moro Muslims had already 
reclaimed much of their land by the time American forces 
returned to the Philippines. 
As mentioned previously, a sizable contingent of the Moro 
citizenry and leadership did not buy into the Japanese 
propaganda such as “Asia for the Asiatics.” Unlike the USAFFE 
and Hukbalahap, however, Moros did not utilize counter-
propaganda, as it was unnecessary.27 Whether this was due to 
Japanese actions or the Moros’ history of chafing under imperial 
rule (and whether it is any imposition of rule, or simply non-
Islamic) is unclear; what is clear is that the Constabulary, and thus 
the Japanese occupational forces, had a far harder time in 
controlling the Muslim population.28 Furthermore, this difficulty 
spread to the local non-Islamic populations too, as Moro and 
Christian forces frequently collaborated in opposing the Japanese.  
This is not to say that there was no difficulty, however, as 
there were various cases of Moro hostility toward Christian 
Filipino and American forces as well. Nor, curiously, was there 
frequent collaboration between separate Moro communities. 
Unlike MacArthur for the USAFFE or Taruc for the Hukbalahap, 
there was no central figure in the Moro resistance, possibly due to 
the difficulty of communication between islands. The Philippine 
Archipelago is home to more than 140 separate, recognized local 
languages, in addition to English, Spanish, and Arabic. While a 
single national language, Pilipino, was developed and adopted in 
the 1930s, its spread was not yet complete or even assured, thus 
preventing effective communication or cooperation.29 Each fight 
was a separate, individual struggle for the liberation of that 
community, making the success each group had that much more 
impressive. 
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Postwar Filipino Resistance 
 
Just as combat continued after the brief conflict that was the 
Spanish-American War, many of the World War II resistance 
movements did not necessarily put down their arms following the 
Japanese Empire’s surrender. In particular, Luis Taruc and the 
Hukbalahap, continuously denied a voice in government, 
continued hostile actions well after the end of the war. With their 
violent methods already losing public support following the 
recognition of Filipino independence and the Third Philippine 
Republic, and without the threat of Japanese occupation, the 
organization was fully subsumed by the Partido Komunista ng 
Pilipinas as part of the PKP’s struggle against the government 
beginning in 1948. In addition, the murder of the widow and 
daughter of former president Manuel Quezon in 1949 did few 
favors for Hukbalahap public support. Coupled with similar attacks 
and raids on civilians and ostensibly allied forces, both during the 
war and in the years following, the Hukbalahap were seen as 
outlaws and terrorists and combated the Filipino Battalion 
Combat Teams under Minister of Defense and former USAFFE 
guerrilla Ramon Magsaysay. The conflict would continue through 
the surrender of Taruc in May of 1954, finally concluding in 
1955.30 
 The Moros, too, have rebelled against the government 
since the end of the war. On March 18, 1968, roughly 60 young 
Muslim Filipino military recruits were executed by training 
officers on Corregidor, with only one survivor escaping.31 The 
outrage sparked by the massacre led to the creation of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF) by Professor Nur Misuari of 
the University of the Philippines in 1969, calling for a separate 
Bangsamoro state in the Philippines.32 Fighting came to a head 
when, in a government effort to reclaim the Jolo, Sulu from the 
MNLF in 1974, combat resulted in the destruction of much of the 
city. A peace accord in 1976, which pacified the MNLF, although it 
did not allow a separate Islamic state, gave them autonomous 
control over much of Mindanao. The MNLF has not been the only 
active Moro group, however. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
Colin Minor 
 
53 
(MILF) split off from the MNLF in 1977, taking a more militant 
stance on the issue of obtaining a Bangsamoro. And in 1991 the 
Abu Sayyaf Group was formed in part from radical members of 
both the MNLF and MILF. These latter groups have proven to be 
more militant than the modern MNLF, having been party to 
hostage crises and violent takeovers. The conflicts between these 
groups and the Filipino government still continue, though 
negotiations are underway to create a new autonomous region in 
Mindanao under MILF supervision.33 
 
 
 When General Douglas MacArthur left the Philippines in 
March of 1942, the Allied American and Filipino forces under his 
command had retreated to the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor 
Island and would soon be subjected to the torture of the Bataan 
Death March. Ever on the defensive and on the verge of being 
overrun, MacArthur, ordered to retreat, effectively surrendered 
the Philippine Archipelago to the Japanese invaders, although he 
promised to return. By the time that he finally returned on 
October 20, 1944, it was the Japanese who were on the back foot, 
with their naval forces severely crippled from the Battle of 
Midway. Following the destruction of four Japanese aircraft 
carriers, Imperial forces proved unable to counter the American 
strategy of leapfrogging via island hopping;34 preparations were 
already underway for the now famous amphibious attack on Iwo 
Jima. On the Philippines, too, the situation was vastly different. 
While the Japanese forces still controlled the islands, they had 
been harried by guerrilla forces across the islands for more than 
two years. Guerrilla groups both communist and capitalist, 
Muslim and Christian, American and Filipino worked to weaken 
the Japan’s grip on the islands, using a variety of methods, led by 
the next generation of Filipino leaders. When General MacArthur 
landed on the beach at Leyte, his first time on Filipino soil in two-
and-a-half years, he had this to say: 
 
This is the voice of freedom, General MacArthur 
speaking. People of the Philippines: I have 
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returned. ... Our forces stand again on Philippine 
soil--soil consecrated in the blood of our two 
peoples. We have come, dedicated and committed 
to the task of destroying every vestige of enemy 
control over your daily lives, and of restoring ... the 
liberties of your people. At my side is your 
President, Sergio Osmena. ... The seat of your 
government is now therefore firmly re-established 
on Philippine soil. The hour of your redemption is 
here. Your patriots have demonstrated an 
unswerving and resolute devotion to the principles 
of freedom. ... I now call upon your supreme effort 
that the enemy may know from the temper of an 
aroused and outraged people within that he has a 
force there to contend with no less violent than is 
the force committed from without. ... Let the 
indomitable spirit of Bataan and Corregidor lead 
on. As the lines of battle roll forward to bring you 
within the zone of operations, rise and strike! For 
future generations of your sons and daughters, 
strike! In the name of your sacred dead, strike!35 
 
The general meant this as a rallying cry to push the Japanese off 
the islands, but MacArthur knew that through the guerilla and 
military techniques used by the Hukbalahap, Moro, and USAFFE 
forces, the people of the Philippines had been doing so ever since 
he had left. 
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